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BOOK REVIEW
THE REAL-WORLD SHIFT IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
STEPHANOS BIBAS*
RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, & DEBRA
A. LIVINGSTON, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. (NEW YORK:
ASPEN LAW & BUSINESS, 2001). Pp. XXXII, 1598.
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT. CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS, (NEW YORK: ASPEN LAW &
BUSINESS, 2001). PP. LI, 1866.
For four decades, criminal procedure scholars have focused on
federal constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court.' These scholars
have emphasized the Warren Court's creation of new federal
constitutional procedures for defendants and the pendulum-swing
back towards prosecutors under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.2
The main actors in this drama were appellate judges, retrospectively
reviewing convictions after jury trials. Scholars have emphasized
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
(bibas@philo.org). B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. Thanks to Randy
Bezanson, Todd Pettys, Jim Tomkovicz, and Tung Yin for helpful commentary on earlier
drafts of this book review and to Bryan Bennett, Ted Moore, and Keith Kasten for their able
research assistance. © 2002 by Stephanos Bibas; all rights reserved.
I For the sake of brevity, this review refers to the Supreme Court of the United States as
the "Supreme Court."
2 See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 195 (1983) (arguing that the two courts'
approaches were not as far apart as most commentators supposed).
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Supreme Court constitutional rulings on the exclusionary rule and
Miranda warnings, which pitted probative evidence in court against
federal constitutional rights. Many articles still volley back and forth
over the latest major Supreme Court decision on Miranda, United
States v. Dickerson.3
This focus on Supreme Court doctrine continues to rule criminal
procedure, in both scholarly articles and casebooks. But a shift is
afoot. In the last few years, a competing school of thought has begun
to challenge the reigning view. A new, younger breed of scholars has
emerged, focused much more on how these abstract rules play out in
the real world. Scholars are writing about criminal-procedure topics
such as politics4 and race5 that do not fit comfortably within the
traditional doctrinal approach. Recent major articles have addressed
charging decisions,6 plea bargaining,7 and sentencing, 8 topics that
' 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 could not abrogate Miranda's
constitutionally based requirement of pre-interrogation warnings); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). Dickerson and Miranda are considered so central to criminal procedure,
even thirty-five years after Miranda was handed down, that last year the Michigan Law
Review dedicated an all-star symposium issue, comprising six distinct panels, to evaluating
Dickerson. See Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Concession of Law, 99
MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001) (comprising contributions by Paul Cassell, Yale Kamisar, Susan
Klein, Richard Leo, Laurie Magid, Stephen Schulhofer, David Strauss, William Stuntz,
George Thomas, Charles Weisselberg, and Welsh White). Leading criminal procedure
scholars continue to publish on the same topic. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for
Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2001); Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close
Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 287 (2001);
Susan R. Klein, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 567 (2001).
4 The leading scholar on this issue has been William Stuntz. William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J.
1 (1997).
5 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Dan M. Kahan
& Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis in Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153 (1998); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998).
6 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. I (forthcoming 2002).
7 Id.; Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty-Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109
YALE L.J. 857 (2000); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
8 Symposium, Legal Issues and Sociological Consequences of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 87 IOWA L. REV. 357 (2002); Symposium, Sentencing Symposium, 44 ST. LOUIS
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traditionally have drawn less attention than have jury trials.9 A few
more articles consider state law, not just the United States
Constitution." And scholars are paying more attention to other actors
in the process-not just juries and appellate judges, but also police,"
prosecutors,12 and informants.13  (By "real world," then, I do not
mean the dry approach of a how-to manual. Rather, I mean the
myriad sources of law, procedural variants, actors, incentives, and
political and social forces that shape, constrain, and contextualize
doctrine.) The literature is still dominated by doctrinal analyses of
U. L.J. 269 (2000); Symposium, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Ten Years Later, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1231 (1997); Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?
Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1043
(2001). Indeed, the Federal Sentencing Reporter has evolved from a mere reporter of
sentencing-related cases into a serious and often scholarly examination of sentencing law.
9 See Bibas, supra note 7, at 1149-50 & nn.327, 328 (noting that between 1990 and 2000,
law reviews published ten times as many articles about criminal jury trials as about guilty
pleas or plea bargaining, even though there are twenty-four times as many guilty pleas). Of
course, there were some classic earlier articles on plea bargaining, for example, by such
distinguished scholars as Albert Alschuler, Judge Frank Easterbrook, and Stephen
Schulhofer. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 932-33 (1983);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652(1981);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1059 (1976); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84
YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289, 308-09 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a
Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988). Though this literature exists, my point is
that it is much less copious than the literature on jury trials, even though numerically jury
trials are much less important.
10 Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing
Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (2000); Miller & Wright, supra note 6 (examining New
Orleans' charging and plea-bargaining system in detail).
11 For several recent, prominent examples, see Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Debra Livingston,
Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 141;
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997).
12 Several prominent examples include Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 851 (1995); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939 (1997).
13 Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 747 (2002).
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Supreme Court case law and discussions of juries, but the real-world
approach is coming into its own.
This coming real-world shift, however, has been slow to hit the
classroom. Many professors came of age around the shift from the
Warren to Burger Courts and have been shaped by these Courts'
doctrinal changes. They are used to teaching criminal procedure as
federal constitutional law. Besides, students find it simpler to focus
on a single source of law. Professors are more familiar with teaching
from case law than from police manuals, prosecutorial guidelines,
and social-science literature. Many professors never practiced
criminal law or practiced long ago, before the era of guidelines
sentencing and other recent developments. Furthermore, bar
examiners routinely build criminal procedure questions around
Supreme Court doctrine. Most importantly, perhaps, many have
invested years in teaching out of criminal procedure casebooks that
reflect the traditional emphasis on Supreme Court doctrine. Until
recently, no other casebooks existed.
Now, however, a new generation of casebooks is available.
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright's book, Criminal Procedures, breaks
away from Supreme Court doctrine. Instead of treating criminal
procedure as a monolith, it looks at the variety of approaches taken
by states and even occasionally by foreign countries. It looks beyond
case law to emphasize statutes, procedural rules, and police and
prosecutorial policies. It heeds the role of politics and race and
includes social-science material that discusses the real-world impacts
of procedures. And it explores these real-world materials and issues
through classroom problems and drafting exercises, not just
traditional Socratic exploration of case law. 4
Just last year, four leading scholars came out with another
casebook along similar lines. Ronald Allen, William Stuntz, Joseph
Hoffman, and Debra Livingston's book is entitled Comprehensive
14 MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,
AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS xliii, 451-548, 1723-78 (1998) [hereinafter MILLER & WRIGHT];
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, 2002 SUPPLEMENT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (2002) [hereinafter MILLER & WRIGHT 2002
SUPPLEMENT]. This complete textbook is hardcover, but its contents are also available in
two less-expensive paperback editions. One contains the materials on police investigation
and the second contains the materials on prosecution and adjudication, together with an extra
chapter on habeas corpus and collateral attack. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES-THE POLICE: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (1999);
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES-PROSECUTION AND
ADJUDICATION: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (1999).
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Criminal Procedure. Their book emphasizes Supreme Court cases,
but it goes well beyond doctrine to consider policy and practice. Like
Miller & Wright, they devote chapters to topics that traditionally get
short shrift: charging, guilty pleas and bargains, and sentencing.
And, like Miller & Wright, they are sensitive to real-world
considerations, including the roles played by politics, race, drugs, and
money. 5
These new, real-world casebooks reflect the important shift that
is underway in criminal procedure more generally. This review
explores the shift in criminal procedure by comparing Miller &
Wright and Allen et al.'s real-world casebooks with the more
traditional casebooks that focus on Supreme Court doctrine. The
traditional doctrinal casebooks still dominate the market: Kamisar et
al. is used by fifty-six professors, White & Tomkovicz by forty,
Cohen & Hall by thirty-eight, Saltzburg & Capra by thirty-seven, and
Dressler & Thomas by thirty-four. 6 In contrast, Allen et al. is used
15 RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE xxv-xxvi, 3-70,
911-982, 1031-1132, 1287-1352 (2001) [hereinafter ALLEN ET AL.]; RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL.,
2002 SUPPLEMENT: COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2002) [hereinafter ALLEN ET AL.
2002 SUPPLEMENT].
16 NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter COHEN & HALL]; NEIL P. COHEN
& DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS CASES AND
MATERIALS SECOND EDITION 2002 SUPPLEMENT (2002) [hereinafter COHEN & HALL 2002
SUPPLEMENT]; JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (1999) [hereinafter DRESSLER & THOMAS]; JOSHUA
DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, 2002 SUPPLEMENT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES (2002) [hereinafter DRESSLER & THOMAS 2002 SUPPLEMENT];
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
(10th ed. 2002); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., 2002 SUPPLEMENT TO TENTH EDITIONS: MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(2002) [hereinafter KAMISAR ET AL., 2002 SUPPLEMENT]; STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL
J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY (6th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter SALTZBURG & CAPRA]; STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 2002
SUPPLEMENT TO AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY SIXTH EDITION
(2002) [hereinafter SALTZBURG & CAPRA 2002 SUPPLEMENT]; WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J.
TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION
AND PROOF (4th ed. 2001); WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (FOURTH EDITION) 2002
UPDATE (2002) [hereinafter WHITE & TOMKOVICZ 2002 SUPPLEMENT]. The information on
adoptions comes from e-mail from Katherine E. Freije, Account Manager, West Legal
Education Group to Stephanos Bibas, Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of
Law (June 3, 2002, 15:21:57) (on file with the author); e-mail from Jodie R. Humphreys,
Esq., Central Region Representative, Lexis-Nexis Law School Publishing to Stephanos
Bibas, Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (June 4, 2002, 20:34:37) (on
file with the author).
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by thirty-five professors and Miller & Wright by thirty-four. 7 The
real-world books have grabbed a substantial fraction of the market in
the last few years, but theirs remains a minority approach.
What I hope to show is that this nascent shift is of huge
significance and is welcome. It promises to expand criminal
procedure beyond ivory-tower constitutional law to focus on the real-
world impact that millions of citizens feel every year. This shift is
important not only for students, but for the professors who teach
them. Scholarship often builds on classroom topics and insights, and
the shift in teaching will reinforce the fruitful new direction in which
scholarship is headed. This review explores how the various
innovations of the real-world casebooks advance the field past the old
debates over the Warren Court. It not only contrasts the old books
with the new, but also explains the significance of each shift for
teaching and scholarship more generally. This shift is producing a
greater variety of approaches, forcing new teachers and scholars to
reflect on these issues. And, though it is more complex to teach and
less geared to the bar exam, the real-world approach offers much that
the doctrinal approach lacks.
Though the new casebooks and approaches will supplement the
old, I am not suggesting that they should supplant them. There is
room in academia for a variety of approaches and courses, and this
new approach will enrich and diversify the existing mix. Nor do I
mean to suggest that casebook contents rigidly determine thought and
courses. Professors can and do supplement casebook materials,
adding materials and emphasizing perspectives not apparent in the
books themselves. My thesis is more modest: The new real-world
casebooks stimulate and provoke fruitful thought. They challenge
scholars, teachers, and students to confront important issues that we
have often overlooked.
Part I considers the significance of looking beyond judges and
case law to other actors and sources of law. Part II discusses Miller
& Wright's shift of focus from federal law to state law and practice.
Part III examines how factors beyond doctrine come into play:
17 E-mail from Carol McGeehan, Associate Publisher, Aspen Publishing to Stephanos
Bibas, Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (July 17, 2002, 16:07:31) (on
file with the author); e-mail from Carol McGeehan, Associate Publisher, Aspen Publishing
to Stephanos Bibas, Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (July 17, 2002,
16:38:07) (on file with the author); e-mail from Nicole Gauvin, Aspen Publishing to
Stephanos Bibas, Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (Sept. 30, 2002,
15:55:16) (on file with the author).
[Vol. 93
2003] THE REAL-WORLD SHIFT IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 795
politics, race, and drugs. Part IV then looks at the broadening of
focus beyond strictly criminal enforcement to civil and quasi-criminal
procedures. These include the use of civil and criminal forfeitures,
civil commitment of sex offenders, and gang-loitering ordinances.
Part V addresses the real-world shift away from jury trials toward the
hugely important issues of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.
This review concludes with thoughts about the significance of these
changes for criminal procedure teaching and scholarship. It draws
together the various strands into a manifesto for the new real-world
scholarship and an agenda for further research. It ends with thoughts
on how much further criminal procedure can go toward reflecting the
real world.
I. SOURCES OF LAW BEYOND THE COURTS
The first-year law school curriculum is still in the nineteenth
century, the era of the common law. Contracts, torts, and property
are common-law subjects, notwithstanding the occasional
genuflection toward the Restatements or the Uniform Commercial
Code. Criminal law is still predominantly about the common law,
though the Model Penal Code does introduce a little bit of statutory
interpretation. Even the constitutional law course is really about
Supreme Court cases, as it spends little time on history, policy,
empirical or textual analysis, or actors other than judges.1" Civil
procedure is about the only first-year course that requires detailed
study of rules or a code. A few law schools are experimenting with
balancing the first-year curriculum with a statutory or regulatory
course.19 But by and large, entering law students are indoctrinated to
think of law as case law.
Most criminal procedure courses extend this tradition into the
upper-level curriculum. That is why we call them casebooks; we
18 Thomas E. Baker and James E. Viator, Not Another Constitutional Law Course: A
Proposal to Teach a Course on the Constitution, 76 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1991); Neal E.
Devins, Correspondence, The Stuff of Constitutional Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1795 (1992).
19 For example, New York University is about to launch a new course that will introduce
first-year students to the administrative state. Telephone conversation with Rachel
Selinfreund Barkow, Associate Professor, New York University School of Law (July 19,
2002). Columbia has likewise experimented with a first-year course entitled "Foundations of
the Regulatory State," and Harvard has experimented with a first-year unit on courts,
legislatures, and statutes. Curtis J. Berger, A Pathway to Curricular Reform, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 547, 548-49 n.5 (1989) (Columbia); Todd D. Rakoff, The Harvard First-Year
Experiment, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 491,494 tbl. 1, 496 (1989).
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think of cases as the paradigmatic instructional materials.2 °
Traditional doctrinal casebooks focus on reported appellate cases,
which retrospectively review criminal convictions that have already
occurred at trial. Table 1 summarizes the numbers of cases, statutes,
and rules of criminal procedure excerpted by each casebook. I have
counted only quotations amounting to a full paragraph or more, thus
excluding paraphrases and brief quotations:
Table 1
Number of excerpts of cases, statutes, and procedural rules
Cases Statutes Procedural rules
Doctrinal casebooks
Cohen & Hall 119 38 84
Dressier & Thomas 259 1 0
Kamisar et al. 343 11 6
Saltzburg & Capra 416 19 15
White & Tomkovicz 154 0 0
Real-world casebooks
Allen et al. 261 6 6
Miller & Wright 230 130 60
As Table 1 reveals, apart from Cohen & Hall, the traditional
casebooks are quite case-heavy. Kamisar et al. excerpt eight times as
many cases as statutes and rules combined." Saltzburg & Capra
20 See Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory
History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 593, 623 (1997) (noting that
casebooks are the most common instructional texts and are "firmly entrenched," used as the
primary text by 86% of professors surveyed).
21 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 16; KAMISAR ET AL. 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16. 1
have counted as statutes nine American Bar Association Standards and have counted as
procedural rules, one American Law Institute Model Code provision, three Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and two United States Sentencing Guidelines. I have not included in
the chart the one Department of Justice policy and one Model Rule of Professional Conduct
that are in Kamisar et al. Id. at 1364, 1491. Note that Kamisar et al. put out a softbound
supplement that includes selected federal statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. These materials, however, are not integrated into the text. KAMISAR ET AL. 2002
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, Apps. B & C.
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excerpt twelve times as many cases as statutes and rules combined.22
White & Tomkovicz and Dressier & Thomas are even more case-
centered. Neither book excerpts a single state or federal statute or
rule of criminal procedure, though Dressier & Thomas have a single
ABA standard. 3 Of course, quantity is not quality, but it is difficult
to emphasize statutes and rules without some threshold quantity.24
(Professors can add statutes and rules to their courses by assigning
supplemental materials. These supplements, however, do not have
the benefit of being integrated into the text and explanatory notes.)
Allen et al. also are heavy on the case law. They do, however,
balance it with one hundred and thirty-three secondary articles.2
These articles, and the accompanying teacher's manual, do an
22 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16; SALTZBURG & CAPRA 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 16. I have counted as statutes not only the fourteen federal statutes in Saltzburg and
Capra, but also three American Bar Association Standards and two American Law Institute
Model Code provisions. I have counted as procedural rules not only four Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but also eleven United States Sentencing Guidelines. Note that
Saltzburg & Capra's supplement reprints lengthy sections of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the federal USA Patriot Act but does not integrate these into the text.
23 DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 16, at 800-05; WHITE & ToMKOVICZ, supra note 16;
WHITE & ToMKOVIcz 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16. Note that Dressler's supplement
includes appendices that reprint relevant provisions of the United States Constitution,
various federal statutes (the Bail Reform Act, Speedy Trial Act, habeas corpus statutes, the
Jury Selection and Service Act, and statutes governing admissibility of confessions in federal
court), and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These appendices, however, are not
integrated into the text, and so I have not counted them in the chart. DRESSLER & THOMAS
2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 125-219.
Perhaps the inclusion of Cohen & Hall and White & Tomkovicz is comparing apples and
oranges, as the former focuses on adjudication while the latter is about police investigation.
(The other casebooks discussed in this review cover both halves.) Statutes and procedural
rules play a greater role in adjudication than investigation, so it is understandable that White
& Tomkovicz would have fewer of these and Cohen & Hall would have more. Even so, the
disparity is striking.
24 A detailed analysis of the quality and usefulness of each statute and procedural rule is
beyond the scope of this limited review. Suffice it to say that excerpts from Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 or a state equivalent would contribute greatly to the teaching of guilty
pleas. Likewise, the topic of discovery is closely bound up with Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 and its state equivalents. Though Dressier & Thomas, Kamisar et al., and
Saltzburg & Capra have some discussion of these rules and include them in appendices to
their supplements, of all the doctrinal casebooks only Cohen & Hall include substantial
excerpts from them in the book itself. COHEN & HALL, supra, at 351-54 (Rule 16), 421-23
(Rule 11).
25 For example, these articles delve into how plea bargaining is driven by prosecutors'
control over sentencing, their desire to minimize their workloads, possibly their incentives to
penalize aggressive defense lawyers, and defense counsel's limited resources. ALLEN ET AL.,
supra note 15; ALLEN ET AL. 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15; infra part V.
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excellent job of highlighting the powers and incentives of non-
judicial actors. 6
Miller & Wright provide by far the most balanced presentation,
with many statutes, procedural rules, and a variety of other sources.27
They make a point, however, of including the landmark Supreme
Court cases, such as Gideon, Strickland, Mapp, and Miranda.28
Exposure to these other sources of law adds much to the course.
It makes students comfortable with the variety of sources of law,
instead of reinforcing the first-year bias towards courts.29 It teaches
students new interpretive techniques, such as canons of construction
and the debates over legislative history. Other sources of law also
encourage students to see the world prospectively, instead of just
retrospectively reviewing convictions at trial. Going forward, actors
are guided by many sources besides cases. Police rely on what they
learned from the police academy, training manuals, and police
department policies and regulations, as well as statutes. Interrogation
manuals may shape police questioning much more than do cases, and
reported cases may be unrepresentative of routine questioning
methods.3" Prosecutors consider internal prosecutorial policies,
procedures, and regulations. Caseloads, win/loss records, and
political pressures loom large, especially for elected prosecutors,
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1059-75; RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., TEACHER'S
MANUAL: COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 247-50 (2001) [hereinafter ALLEN ET AL.
TEACHER'S MANUAL]. I have not counted one ABA Model Rule in the figures in the table.
27 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14; MILLER & WRIGHT 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note
14. This book and supplement also excerpt twenty-six executive materials (police manuals,
Department of Justice policies and procedures, and government reports and testimony) and
seventy-five secondary sources, including ten social-science articles. This variety is a
conscious objective of the authors: "We make extensive use of state high court cases,
statutes, rules of procedure, and police and prosecutorial policies, and encourage readers to
consider the interactions among multiple institutions." MILLER & WRIGHT, supra, at xliii.
28 Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 394, 527, 810, 846.
29 See Sheppard, supra note 20, at 621-22 (noting the old complaint that casebooks are
biased towards case law and away from legislation and executive materials).
30 See Richard Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
277 (1996) ("[L]aw professors, lawyers, and law students have created a formidable law
review literature that focuses almost entirely on the doctrinal and ethical aspects of
interrogation and confession case law, rather than on the routine activities of legal actors and
institutions. Since traditional legal scholarship is based on an analysis of leading cases-
which are unrepresentative of the larger universe of court cases and thus may depict atypical
police practices as the norm-this literature is by itself both narrow and misleading."
(footnote omitted)).
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though little of this shows up in appellate cases. Defendants who are
deciding whether to plead guilty or gamble and go to trial care about
their likely sentences, not just the case law limiting peremptory
challenges. Sentences depend much more on sentencing guidelines,
judicial discretion, and prosecutorial tactics than they do on appellate
case law. And, as Part V discusses, these other sources of law
illuminate issues that are rarely appealed and so do not show up in
reported cases.
Statutes, regulations, procedures, policies, and discussion of
actors' incentives can shift students' attention away from ex post
review toward ex ante forecasting. This prospective emphasis on
incentives and constraints facilitates student role-playing. Teachers
can challenge students to tackle problems in class, asking them how
prosecutors, defense lawyers, police officers, and defendants would
respond to various rules. Miller & Wright facilitate this approach by
including plenty of real-world problems and drafting exercises.
Scholars can also see more by looking beyond courts. This trend
has already begun but is in its infancy. For example, Dan Richman
has shown perceptively that limits on using evidence of defendants'
prior crimes will skew prosecutors' selection of cases in unintended
ways.3 In a similar vein, I have discussed how a criminal procedure
could interact with sentencing guidelines to give prosecutors
unintended leverage in plea bargaining.32 Once we look past judges
and cases, we can better see this kind of ex ante impact of other
sources of law on other actors' behavior. As these articles showed,
courts are often blind to the dynamic effects of their rulings on future
behavior. Perhaps a richer scholarship about non-judicial actors and
sources of law could teach courts to see these impacts and
interactions.33 Broadening the casebooks that train future professors,
judges, and legislators is an important step toward correcting this
omission in academia and practice.
31 Richman, supra note 12.
32 Bibas, supra note 7.
33 Todd Pettys has suggested to me that this new emphasis in scholarship could create a
virtuous cycle. Scholars might encourage judges and future judges and law clerks (i.e.,
students) to delve into these other materials and actors' incentives. These judges and clerks
might then draft opinions that incorporate this richer real-world perspective. Casebook
authors might then include these opinions, which would provide a more comprehensive
perspective on the law and so reduce the need for supplemental commentary.
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II. EXPLORING STATE LAW
A second staple of traditional law school curricula is federal law.
Though a few first-year courses are primarily about state law, many
courses center on federal law. This is especially true in criminal
procedure, thanks to the view of the Warren Court as the font of
criminal procedure. The combination of emphases on case law and
federal law has meant that traditional doctrinal casebooks emphasize
the role of the Supreme Court. For example, every case excerpted in
White & Tomkovicz is from the Supreme Court; I did not find a
single excerpt from any state authority.34 All but two of the cases
excerpted in Cohen & Hall are federal, and most of those are
Supreme Court cases.35 With three exceptions, every authority
excerpted in Saltzburg & Capra is federal, and most of those are
Supreme Court cases. 36 Almost all of the cases excerpted in Kamisar
et al. and Dressler & Thomas are Supreme Court cases.37 (All of
34 WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 16; see also id. at v ("The cases presented are
limited to those decided by the United States Supreme Court.").
35 COHEN & HALL, supra note 16; COHEN & HALL 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16.
This book and supplement, by my count, excerpt ninety-seven Supreme Court cases, twenty
other federal cases, two federal constitutional provisions (plus the Declaration of
Independence), nineteen federal statutes, eighty Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
four tables from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In contrast, they excerpt two state cases,
zero state constitutional provisions, zero state procedural rules, eleven state statutes, and one
state sentencing guideline. They also excerpt eight secondary articles.
36 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16; SALTZBURG & CAPRA 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 16. By my count, this book and its supplement excerpt 293 Supreme Court cases, 120
other federal cases, fourteen federal statutes, four Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
eleven United States Sentencing Guidelines. They excerpt three state cases, zero state
statutes, and zero state procedural rules. They also excerpt two American Law Institute
Model Code provisions, three American Bar Association standards, and forty-four secondary
articles. The supplement also includes lengthy chunks of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the federal USA Patriot Act.
37 By my count, the Dressler & Thomas book and its most recent supplement excerpt 236
Supreme Court cases, fourteen other federal cases, zero federal statutes, and zero Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, in contrast with nine state cases, zero state statutes, and zero
state procedural rules, as well as one ABA standard. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 16;
DRESSLER & THOMAS 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16. This count does not include the
lengthy appendices to the 2002 Supplement, which reprint in full various federal statutes and
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
By my count, the Kamisar et al. and its most recent supplement excerpt 285 Supreme
Court cases, forty-one other federal cases, three Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, two
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and one Department of Justice policy, in contrast with
seventeen state cases, zero state statutes, and zero state procedural rules. (They also include
one ALl Model Code provision, nine ABA standards, one Model Rule of Professional
Conduct, and seventy-six secondary articles.) KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 16; KAMISAR ET
2003] THE REAL- WORLD SHIFTIN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 801
these figures count only quotations amounting to a full paragraph or
more, thus excluding paraphrases and brief quotations in the notes.)
Allen et al. likewise focus on federal law. Almost all of the cases
excerpted are Supreme Court cases, and all statutes and procedural
rules are federal as well.38 Some traditional doctrinal casebooks, such
as Kamisar et al., go so far as to delve into the views of all of the
Supreme Court Justices.39
Federal criminal procedure, however, is only a small sliver of the
pie. Roughly 95% of felony cases are disposed of in state court.
When one includes misdemeanors and violations, the figure exceeds
99.5%. 40 States still handle most traditional crimes-murder, rape,
robbery, burglary, arson, assault, and battery. True, the U.S.
Constitution does in places regulate state criminal procedures. But
state constitutions, statutes, procedural rules, cases, and policies often
go well beyond the federal minimum.4' Moreover, criminal justice
AL. 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16. These figures do not include the lengthy appendices
to the 2002 Supplement, which reprint the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and selected
federal statutes.
38 By my count, the Allen et al. book and its most recent supplement excerpt 242
Supreme Court cases, twelve other federal cases, and seven state cases. The book and
supplement excerpt six federal statutes and six Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
compared with zero state statutes or procedural rules. They also excerpt about 133
secondary sources (eighty-two law review articles and fifty-one other articles) ALLEN ET AL.,
supra note 15; ALLEN ET AL. 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15. Two of these articles discuss
the role of state courts in protecting defendants' rights. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 67-
70.
39 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 16, at v (chart of Justices' dates of service), vii ("[W]e
have taken pains to set forth the views of all the [Supreme Court] Justices in the leading
cases."); see WHITE & ToMKOVICZ, supra note 16, at v-vii (noting their effort to preserve all
of the Supreme Court Justices' reasoning, including often concurring and dissenting
opinions, and containing a chart listing the years of service of each recent Justice of the
Supreme Court).
40 Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, tbl. 5.16 (2001) (58,718 criminal cases were terminated
in federal court in fiscal year 2001, of which about 46,439 were felony cases) with id. tbl.
5.40 (there were 927,717 felony convictions in state court in 1998) and COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2001, tbl.
7, at 138 (roughly 13,050,399 criminal cases were disposed of in state trial courts in 2000).
41 Under the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds, federal courts cannot
review state courts' decisions for defendants based on their interpretations of their own
constitutions, even if the state courts also recited separate federal grounds for their decisions.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). This doctrine recognizes that state law has an
important role to play distinct from federal law. It also invites state courts to pronounce
clearly doctrines that go beyond federal law if they wish to avoid federal review. Miller &
STEPHANOS BIBAS [Vol. 93
systems involve many actors besides Supreme Court Justices,
including police, prosecutors, defense counsel, defendants, and state
courts and legislatures.
Miller & Wright break away from the federal approach to focus
on state law. The plural title of their book, Criminal Procedures,
reflects their commitment to the diversity of state and federal
approaches. Roughly 62% of their procedural rules, 72% of their
cases, and 82% of their statutes come from states rather than the
federal government.42 Their approach is clever: they include many
state cases that discuss the federal rule before rejecting or following
it. These cases effectively consolidate the federal approach and focus
on the merits of rules, instead of individual Supreme Court Justices
and stare decisis.43 Miller & Wright use the first explanatory note on
each topic to summarize the federal, majority, and significant
minority positions." The course becomes much less about federal
constitutional law and more about the main state variations. The
Wright note the vibrancy of this doctrine and devote a subsection to it. MILLER & WRIGHT,
supra note 14, at 319-24.
States often take advantage of their leeway to deviate from the federal rule. I counted
close to forty doctrines in Miller & Wright for which ten or more states deviate from the
federal rule. For example, a majority of states have rejected the Supreme Court's approach
and required police to notify suspects if a retained attorney is available. A majority of states
define the petty-offense exception to the jury-trial right in ways different from the federal
approach. And about half of states forbid preventive detention, even though federal law
allows it. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 623 (availability of retained attorney), 1386-
87 (juries for petty offenses); MILLER & WRIGHT 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 14, at 202
(preventive detention).
42 By my count, Miller & Wright's book and supplement excerpt sixty-one Supreme
Court cases, three other federal cases, twenty-one federal statutes, eight Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and fifteen U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, compared with 161 state cases,
ninety-seven state statutes, and thirty-seven state rules of criminal procedure. (The book
also contains three cases and three statutes from other countries, as well as four Model Code
provisions, eight ABA sources, fourteen law review articles, and sixty-one other secondary
sources (including thirteen government reports and nineteen internal governmental
regulations and policies)). MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14; MILLER & WRIGHT 2001
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 14. This use of state materials is one of their conscious objectives:
"In each area we present competing rules from the federal and state systems. We also
occasionally examine procedures from earlier times or from non-U.S. systems. Review of
different possible procedural rules encourages critical analysis and helps identify the
assumptions held and judgments made in designing each criminal system." MILLER &
WRIGHT, supra, at xliii.
43 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at xliv.
44 Id.
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point is not to teach the law of one particular state, but to expose
students to the main variations out there.
Miller & Wright's approach recognizes that states, not federal
courts, are now the prime laboratories of experimentation. It used to
be that federal law was the source of progressive innovation. The
emphasis on federal law stems from a time when the Warren Court
was imposing procedures that went well beyond what states already
required. But the Rehnquist Court has trimmed back the Warren
Court's rules and rarely creates major new rules. Now, state courts
and legislatures are more likely to go beyond federal law. In doing
so, they may innovate as the Warren Court once did. 5 Miller &
Wright's use of state-law variations highlights this possibility.
There are some advantages to concentrating on federal law.
Students find it easier to learn a single body of law and can be bewil-
dered by a wide panoply of alternatives. It takes careful teaching to
keep the majority rule and federal rule clear in students' minds. Also,
bar examiners continue to test on the Supreme Court's federal
constitutional decisions in this area. These advantages of the
traditional approach are significant, but there are countervailing
considerations. Most students will practice in firms and areas that
require them to deal with at least some state-law issues and would
benefit from the exposure. And studying state procedures can teach
students to cope with complexity and use it to their advantage. When
practicing in a jurisdiction where a legal point is unsettled, students
can learn to cite authorities from other jurisdictions that have already
decided the issue.
The shift from federal to state law broadens criminal procedure
scholarship as well. It reminds us that criminal procedure is much
more than a corner of federal constitutional law.46 Scholars and
students can pay more attention to the variety of state procedures and
the ways in which different procedures may serve different local
needs.
45 See Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State
Constitutional Law and Selective Incorporation, 87 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 63-66
(1996) (noting that the expansion of federal constitutional rights was premised on the idea
that state courts would not protect defendants adequately, but now state courts interpret their
own constitutions and laws to provide protections as broad as or broader than those provided
by federal law).
46 Cf Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that criminal procedure is constitutional law, but rejecting
its conventional but artificial separation from substantive criminal law, sentencing, and the
funding of defense counsel).
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For example, if one read only the federal discovery statutes and
rules, one might think that prosecutors never turn over witnesses'
names or prior statements until the eve of trial.47 A substantial
minority of states, however, require pretrial discovery of prosecution
witnesses' names and sometimes even their statements.4" Even where
the law does not require it, in practice prosecutors may turn over this
material somewhat earlier. This diversity of practice can spark
discussion of the benefits of full disclosure versus the risks of witness
intimidation and fabrication of alibis. Perhaps the answer should
vary by state or by type of case: disclosure might be desirable in rural
states, but not in states with more organized crime or gangs.
Consider another example. Many commentators have thought
that plea bargaining is inevitable. 9 El Paso and Alaska, however,
experimented with bans on plea bargaining." Perhaps these experi-
ments are models for the rest of the country, or perhaps they show
that populous states cannot hope to maintain bans.
To take a third example, most scholars criticize the failings of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.5 This chorus of criticism might lead
one to believe that determinate sentencing is clearly a failure.
Looking at federal sentencing alone, however, is misleading. Many
states, such as Minnesota, have more flexible sentencing guidelines.
Examining these state guidelines can illuminate how they are better
than the federal guidelines, charting a path for sentencing reform.5
Scholars have not entirely neglected these state variations, but more
cultivation of state-law vineyards would yield richer fruit.
47 FED. R. GRIM. P. 16 (making no provision for discovery of prosecution witnesses'
names or statements, except for expert witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (forbidding discovery of
witness statements in federal prosecutions until the witness has testified on direct
examination at trial).
'8 Good examples include Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A); N.J. Ct. R. 3:13-3.
49 The classic statement of this position is MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE
EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 157-62 (1978). A few
scholars, however, have dissented; the most notable is Stephen Schulhofer, Is Plea
Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037 (1984) (contesting the inevitability of plea
bargaining by noting that Philadelphia disposes of many cases via speedy bench trials).
50 Teresa Cams & John Kruse, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining Reevaluated, 75
JUDICATURE 310 (1992); Robert Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study
of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REv. 265 (1987).
s1 The best and most thorough critique is KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
52 Two good treatments of the Minnesota system and its virtues are DALE PARENT,
STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1988) and MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND THEIR EFFECTS (1987).
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III. MOVING BEYOND DOCTRINE
A third characteristic of traditional casebooks is their strong
emphasis on doctrine, especially constitutional doctrine. The staples
of the traditional doctrinal casebook are the definitive Supreme Court
cases-Gideon, Mapp, and Miranda,53 but also a host of less-famous
cases. As Saltzburg & Capra note: "Like most criminal procedure
books, this one places much emphasis on constitutional rules. 54
Students are comfortable having a black-letter rule to learn and
memorize. They came to law school expecting hard-and-fast rules,
and they can fit rules into a neat outline. And professors are used to
teaching doctrinal rules and exceptions.
These advantages, however, come at a significant price.
Criminal procedure is much more rich and complex than just
doctrine. Doctrine forms the skeleton, but a host of other
considerations add flesh and give life to that skeleton: politics, race,
and drugs, to name a few. Traditional doctrinal casebooks include
few materials on race, politics, or drugs, beyond the occasional
doctrinal subsection. White & Tomkovicz do not discuss politics or
race at all. Their discussion of drugs is limited to brief comments on
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment drug cases." Cohen & Hall
do a bit more, spending one page discussing racial and gender
disparities. They also include standard doctrinal sections on selective
prosecution and discrimination in peremptory challenges, plea
bargaining, and the death penalty. 6 Likewise, Saltzburg & Capra
have standard doctrinal sections on the use of race in voir dire,
peremptory challenges, selective prosecution, and racial profiles for
searches. They also have standard sections on drug-test searches
under the Fourth Amendment. 7 None of these books, however, goes
much beyond doctrine. Of the doctrinal casebooks, Kamisar et al.
53 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Mappv. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
54 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16, at viii.
55 WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 16, at 422-24.
56 COHEN & HALL, supra note 16, at 4-5, (race and gender disparities in statistics), 37-48
(selective prosecution), 415-16 (plea bargaining), 644-62 (peremptory challenges), 753-54,
770-71 (death penalty).
57 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16, at 189-90 (Terry stops), 231-37 (reasonable
suspicion to stop a suspect), 258-59 (aggressive police tactics), 290-98 (pretextual stops and
equal protection), 368-89 (drug testing), 818-24 (selective prosecution, including a one-page
critique noting the influence of unconscious racism), 1104-05 (voir dire), 1120-40
(peremptory challenges); SALTZBURG & CAPRA 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 47-60
(drug testing).
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and Dressler & Thomas do the most on race (though they say little
about politics and drugs). In addition to the standard doctrinal
sections on racial topics, they preface their books with some
materials that consider the history and policy implications of race.58
With these partial exceptions, none of the doctrinal casebooks
considers how politics, race, and drugs influence the actions and
attitudes of legislators, police, prosecutors, and citizens.
Politics, however, plays an enormous role in criminal enforce-
ment. Many elected state judges fight campaign battles over their
toughness on crime.59 Legislators pass myriad new criminal statutes
to prove their toughness on crime.6" District attorneys, who are often
elected, campaign on winning high-profile convictions and favorable
win-loss ratios.6 Legislatures team up with prosecutors to make
crimes broad, overlapping, and easier to prove. Prosecutors thus
have many bargaining chips and can press most defendants to plead
guilty, which saves resources and avoids the risk of losing.62
Even more important than politics is the role of race. A greater
percentage of minorities are arrested and convicted and receive
harsher sentences than whites. They are also much more likely to be
victims of crime. Criminal procedure doctrine, however, pays little
attention to race. The Supreme Court has rejected almost all
challenges to facially neutral criminal procedures that result in large
58 DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 16, at 1-22 (overview of race in criminal justice),
234-44 (pretextual stops), 369-70, 392 (role of race in reasonable suspicion), 1093-99, 1102-
07 (race in voir dire), 1116-39 (peremptory challenges), 1151-55 (race-based jury
nullification); KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 16, at 91-93 (article on history of racism in
criminal justice), 93-99 (articles on role of politics and funding of defense counsel), 100-07
(articles on racial profiling), 226-33 (race and pretextual stops), 305-06, 313 (racial
profiling), 321, 329-30 (drug testing), 868-82 (selective prosecution), 939-43, 946-48
(discrimination in grand jury composition), 1324-26, 1332-47, 1356-58 (role of race in voir
dire and peremptory challenges), 1507-08 (race in sentencing).
59 See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759 (1995); Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections. Lessons from the
Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68 (Sept./Oct. 1999).
60 See Stuntz, supra note 4; Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The
Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development
of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
61 See Miller & Wright, The Screening-Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 6 (describing
New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick Sr.'s electoral campaigns); Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 4, at 534.
62 William Stuntz's analysis of this dynamic is excellent. See Stuntz, supra note 4.
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disparities.63 Yet an exclusive focus on doctrine can miss the subtler
ways in which race affects criminal justice. Racial disparities cause
many citizens, especially minorities, to lose faith in or at least
question the criminal law. This loss of faith can lead to jury
nullification or political pressures for reform.' The Supreme Court's
suspicion of racism in state police and courts led it to create much of
criminal procedure doctrine.6" Perhaps these doctrines should not
apply as strictly when police are cooperating with minority
communities instead of persecuting them.66
A related issue is the war on illegal drugs. Some racial
disparities flow from the enforcement of drug laws, such as the
heavier penalties for crack than for powder cocaine.67 More
generally, drug crimes are now the paradigmatic crimes in our
system. Drug crimes account for about a third of felony
convictions;68 the percentage is even higher if one includes money
63 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (requiring a substantial threshold
showing before allowing discovery on a claim of racially selective prosecution); McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting a statistical claim that defendants who killed white
victims were more likely to receive the death penalty). It has been well over a hundred years
since a defendant succeeded in persuading the Court to overturn a prosecution as racially
selective. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
64 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 714 (1995) (proposing racially based jury nullification
for drug and other malum prohibitum crimes, as a form of political protest against a racially
unjust system). Other commentators look at the issue from the perspective of minority
victims, who may favor more aggressive law enforcement even if it happens to fall on
minority perpetrators. See KENNEDY, supra note 5.
65 Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 48 (2000).
66 Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan note that the Supreme Court's vagueness cases were
"decided against the background of institutionalized racism" that relied on police to repress
minorities. (They discuss Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), in which police
in the South used an anti-loitering ordinance to harass interracial couples.) They argue that
this distrust of police discretion should not carry over to order-maintenance policing,
because this assists minority communities' efforts to control gangs instead of harming them.
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 197, 205, 209. But see Dorothy E.
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
Policing, 89 J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 821, 827-28 (1999) (contending that white
legislators are imposing these laws on minority communities and that seemingly color-blind
laws produce continued racial inequities that require stringent constitutional regulation).
67 David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283,
1283-84 (1995).
68 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 40, tbls. 5.40 (documenting that in 1998,
33.9% of state felony convictions (314,626 out of 927,717) were for drug possession or
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laundering and gun and violent crimes related to drugs. And
offenders often commit crimes under the influence of drugs or to get
money to buy drugs. This emphasis on drugs affects myriad elements
of our system. Drug treatment is an important part of rehabilitation,
and the new drug courts are premised on helping offenders to
overcome drug addiction.69  Drug-search cases shape Fourth
Amendment law, and high drug caseloads drive law-enforcement
priorities and pressures to plea bargain.7" Students and scholars think
of procedure in trans-substantive terms, but they might adopt a more
nuanced view by considering the contexts in which these cases arose.
For example, the suspicion needed to make a search reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment might vary depending on the importance of
the crime being investigated."1 To understand this point, one must
see that the Court's assessment of the war on drugs shapes its
doctrine.72 The lesson for future lawyers is to couch procedural
arguments in terms of their substantive impact. If a court views a
crime as a serious problem, it is more likely to issue a procedural
ruling for the prosecution, and vice versa.
The real-world casebooks do much more with politics, race, and
drugs than simply recite doctrine. Miller & Wright go well beyond
the doctrinal discussions of selective prosecution, peremptory
challenges, and disparities in capital punishment. They consider race
trafficking), 5.9 (showing that in 2001, 29.7% of federal criminal cases filed (18,425 out of
62,134) were for violations of the drug laws).
69 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000). But see Morris B. Hoffman,
The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1437 (2000) (Colorado state judge expresses
skepticism about the efficacy of drug courts).
70 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding random, suspicionless
urinalysis of all students engaged in extracurricular activities because "the nationwide drug
epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school"); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding random drug tests for
customs employees).
71 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 801-
02(1994).
72 For example, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life without parole for
possessing 672 grams of cocaine against a claim that it was an excessive punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Crucial to the analysis of the controlling opinion was
its finding that "illegal drugs represent one of the greatest problems affecting the health and
welfare of our population." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 70 (citing cases in
which the Supreme Court upheld random, suspicionless urinalyses against Fourth
Amendment challenge because of the importance of the war on drugs).
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at many stages: searches, arrests, bail, cross-racial identifications,
charging, sentencing, and punishment. Indeed, they devote an entire
chapter to the role of race in criminal justice.73 They consider not
only drug testing, profiling, and drug taxes, but also how sentencing
differentials between crack and powder cocaine create racial
disparities.74  They consider pretrial diversion, which typically
involves drug treatment, as an alternative to prosecution.7 ' They also
devote a short half-chapter to how politics influences legislators,
judges, and constitutions in ways that affect criminal justice. This
section considers, for example, whether the political imperative of the
war on drugs has created "a 'drug-smuggler exception' to the Fourth
Amendment."76
An awareness of political and racial dynamics recurs throughout
the book. To give just one political example, Miller & Wright's
materials go far beyond Strickland and effective assistance of counsel
in individual cases. They consider also the effectiveness of various
systems of providing counsel and note that some statutory schemes
are chronically underfunded and overburdened. This leads discussion
in a variety of directions. For example, legislators who want to seem
tough on crime have little incentive to provide enough funding for
defense counsel. Given the separation of powers, can judges goad
legislators by invalidating convictions or ordering funding? Should
they? They consider whether underfunding in effect compels guilty
pleas and whether legislatures are wrong to spend more on
prosecution than defense. This analysis of institutional competition
and cooperation, incentives, and policies goes well beyond the
traditional doctrinal casebook.7 7
Allen et al. are even better at handling these real-world topics.
Like Kamisar et al., they begin with an introductory chapter on crime
73 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 71-77 (reasonable suspicion), 78-86 (pretextual
stops), 352-54 (arrests), 374 (excessive force), 691, 732-37 (cross-racial identification), 923,
939 (bail), 1020-29 (selective prosecution), 1070-72, 1410-21 (voir dire), 1428-57
(peremptory challenges), 1475-76, 1693-94, 1723-30 (racial disparities in general), 1730-42
(capital punishment), 1742-62 (differential participation in crimes and the disparity between
sentences for crack and powder cocaine), 1763-77 (prosecutorial charging practices);
MILLER & WRIGHT 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 14, at 36-49, 203-06.
74 Id. at 61-70 (drug courier profiles), 274-82 (drug testing), 922-23 (drug testing as
condition of bail), 1161-62 (drug taxes), 1742-62 (the crack/powder cocaine sentence
disparity).
71 Id. at 975-85.
76 Id. at 538-47.
77 Id. at 868-94.
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statistics and secondary literature, including articles on race and
drugs. They discuss race not only in doctrinal sections, but also in
policy analyses of gang-loitering laws and racial disparities in setting
bail and drug sentencing.7" And an appreciation of politics runs
through the book. For example, they note that prosecutorial charging
discretion allows legislatures to pass overbroad criminal laws. Broad
laws are politically popular because they are tough on crime: they
keep the culpable from getting away, at the cost of criminalizing too
much conduct. Legislatures can do so because they trust that
prosecutors usually will not charge sympathetic defendants, which
would cause a political backlash. Allen et al. then show that one
downside of this almost-unreviewable discretion is the danger of
racially selective prosecution.79
This sophisticated interplay of politics, race, and doctrine
teaches students far more about the real world than a simple presenta-
tion of the selective-prosecution doctrine would. It also nudges
scholars away from proposing doctrines that look good on paper but
are unworkable or harmful given real-world politics, racial
disparities, and the like. For example, a sentencing rule designed for
an ideal world of jury trials can be disastrous where the political
reality is that legislatures will not reduce pressures to plead guilty."0
One may hope that more scholars will consider not just theoretical
ideals, but also the political and racial world in which we actually
live.
IV. CIVIL AND QUASI-CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
A fourth important difference between the doctrinal and real-
world casebooks is that the latter look beyond traditional criminal
enforcement. Traditionally, governments have fought crime by
arresting perpetrators, prosecuting them for violating criminal
statutes, proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and incarcerating
them. This traditional criminal approach is still the mainstay of crime
control, but in recent years police and prosecutors have used an array
of other tools to fight crime, including: order-maintenance policing;
78 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 25-26, 43-46 (general commentary), 82-84, 369-70,
457-63, 489-98 (racial profiling), 514 (search and seizure), 542-43 (gang-loitering
ordinances), 919-29 (selective prosecution), 929-30 (sentencing policy), 986-87, 1003-04
(pretrial release), 1208-23 (peremptory challenges), 1224-25 (jury nullification), 1289
(capital sentencing); ALLEN ET AL. 2002 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 57-60.
79 Id. at 916-30; ALLEN ET AL. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 26, at 221-23.
80 Bibas, supra note 7, at 1159 & n.357.
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anti-gang loitering injunctions; civil nuisance suits; civil and criminal
forfeiture; and civil commitment of sex offenders. These tools are of
great practical importance: for example, the federal government alone
now forfeits more than half a billion dollars' worth of assets each
year." These new tools are powerful and flexible, but some of their
flexibility comes from evading traditional safeguards such as juries
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In short, these cutting-edge
weapons in the war on crime are powerful and controversial.
These topics do not, however, fit within the doctrinal purview of
traditional criminal procedure casebooks. Of the five doctrinal
casebooks, four devote between zero and two pages to all of these
topics combined. 2  Saltzburg & Capra offer somewhat more
coverage, though even their treatment is limited to modest doctrinal
discussions.83
In contrast, the real-world casebooks not only devote space to
these important topics but also consider how they operate in practice.
Allen et al. introduce their book with an excerpt that explains how
legislatures can recharacterize criminal laws as civil and vice versa.
They consider forfeiture in multiple contexts. In addition, they
repeatedly consider the roles of police beyond criminal investigation,
such as order maintenance and community caretaking.84 Miller &
Wright devote their entire first chapter to police roles other than
traditional criminal law enforcement: community caretaking,
enforcing civility, order maintenance, and curfews. They devote
another chapter to forfeitures, considering how their procedural
protections differ and the tactical and financial incentives that police
81 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 1141.
82 COHEN & HALL, supra note 16, at 777-79 (forfeitures); DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra
note 16, at 1346-47 (double jeopardy and civil penalties); KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 16, at
1049-50 (same); WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 16 (no coverage).
83 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16, at 2-5 (the civil/criminal line and civil
commitment of sex offenders), 213-14 (anti-gang loitering ordinances), 397 (community
caretaking search), 1281-89, 1327-33 (forfeiture), 1337 (civil commitment of insanity
acquittees), 1432-41 (civil penalties as punishment for double jeopardy purposes); SALTZURG
& CAPRA 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 1-2 (criminal procedural limits on civil
commitment of sex offenders).
84 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 36-37 (the civil/criminal line), 48-50 (order-
maintenance policing), 226-39 (impact of forfeitures on defendant's choice of counsel), 411-
13 (community-caretaking policing), 525-44 (extended consideration of anti-gang loitering
laws, police maintenance of order, and the roles of race and politics in these laws), 1302-03
(excessiveness of forfeitures), 1405-26 (applicability of double jeopardy to civil penalties
such as forfeitures); ALLEN ET AL. 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 105-06 (applicability
of double jeopardy to civil commitment of sex offenders).
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and prosecutors have to use them. They also consider tort actions
seeking damages or injunctions as alternatives to excluding evidence
from illegal searches.8"
My point is not simply that casebooks should discuss forfeiture,
for example. Casebooks can go much further, to explain police and
prosecutorial incentives to use and abuse this civil procedure. This
matters to students, as it teaches them why these procedures exist,
their pros and cons, and how one can use or abuse them. And it
matters to scholars, who sometimes reify the doctrinal divides
between subjects, such as criminal versus civil procedure. Courts
may at times police these boundaries, but actors can and do exploit
the overlap.
These artificial doctrinal divides illustrate a more general issue
with law school curricula. In the nineteenth century, treatises were
organized by real-world subject matter: railroads, charterparties,
easements, and so on. We now see these as quaint, musty ways of
fragmenting what are "really" property, contracts, and so on. But just
as the old subject-matter divisions obscured doctrinal themes, so the
modem doctrinal divisions obscure subject-matter themes. One
possibility is to go back to subject-matter organization. Another
approach may be to create some kind of hybrid, in which courses
discuss the interaction of related bodies of law or norms. The
criminal procedure course, for example, could include some
consideration of civil and quasi-criminal alternatives. Likewise,
contracts classes might consider the roles of informal and legally
unenforceable agreements and norms such as reciprocity in achieving
similar ends. In addition, classes could move away from the artificial
isolation of issues; real-world clients do not walk in the door and say,
"I have a discrete torts issue for you." Teachers could instead move
toward classroom problems and exam questions that require, for
example, analyzing how tort suits against police affect aggressive
criminal-law enforcement. Seeing these interactions can benefit
scholarship as well as teaching. Scholars, for example, can discuss
how proposals for restrictive new criminal procedures may push
enforcement to the less-regulated civil side.
Of course, there are always tradeoffs. A three-credit course has
only so many hours and so many pages of assignments. More time
85 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 1-36 (other police roles), 435-49 (tort actions for
damages or injunctive relief and criminal prosecutions as alternatives to exclusion of
evidence), 1141-89 (forfeiture); MILLER & WRIGHT 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 14, at 1-5
(other police roles), 5-18 (anti-gang-loitering ordinances), 219-31 (forfeiture).
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spent on forfeiture means less on Miranda, say, and more time on
real-world context means less on Supreme Court doctrine. Some
instructors will include more real-world materials. Others will
continue to emphasize Supreme Court doctrine and theory as a
simpler and cleaner pedagogical approach. Whether or not one
agrees with the real-world emphasis, one must at least confront and
ponder these tradeoffs, instead of blindly following traditional
methods simply because they are traditional. The addition of the new
real-world casebooks helps to provoke thought about these tradeoffs.
V. MORE THAN JURY TRIALS
The final big distinction among casebooks concerns how much
they emphasize jury trials versus charging and plea bargaining. Our
culture romanticizes jury trials, even though charging decisions and
plea bargains matter more in practice. Traditional doctrinal
casebooks devote huge chunks of space to jury trials and much less to
other important topics. Saltzburg & Capra devote 343 pages (one-
fifth of their book) to trial procedure. In contrast, they spend only
twenty-five pages on police and prosecutorial charging decisions and
thirty-eight pages on guilty pleas and bargains. They devote more
space to grand jury screening than police and prosecutorial screening,
even though grand juries are little more than rubber stamps.86
Dressler & Thomas and Kamisar et al. likewise emphasize trials,
though not as much.87 Once again, Cohen & Hall are somewhat more
balanced than the other doctrinal books, though they too devote the
lion's share of their space to trial procedure.88
86 SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16, at 808-30 (police and prosecutorial charging and
screening), 830-60 (grand jury screening), 959-96 (guilty pleas and bargains), 997-1309
(trial procedure); SALTZBURG & CAPRA 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 112-153 (trial
procedure). As Chief Judge Sol Wachtler famously observed, a grand jury would indict even
a ham sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to. People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 124 (N.Y.
1990) (Titone, J., dissenting).
87 DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 16, at 795-816 (prosecutorial charging discretion),
817-39 (grand jury screening), 1011-67 (pleas and bargains), 1068-1233 (trial procedure);
DRESSLER & THOMAS 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 81-82 (pleas and bargains), 82-85
(trial procedure); KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 16, at 844-97 (prosecutorial charging), 932-79
(grand jury screening), 1232-1310 (guilty pleas and bargains), 1311-1442 (trial procedure).
88 COHEN & HALL, supra note 16, at 23-66 (police and prosecutorial charging), 389-460
(guilty pleas and bargains), 547-712 (trial procedure); COHEN & HALL 2001 SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 16, at 17-18 (guilty pleas and bargains), 23-28 (trial procedure).
It is not fair to compare White & Tomkovicz to the other casebooks on this score,
because it deliberately limits its focus to police work and so would not naturally reach
charging, plea bargaining, or sentencing.
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This trial-centered approach goes hand-in-hand with the
traditional focus on Supreme Court doctrine and case law. Doctrines
that are the subject of frequent litigation show up in appellate case
law disproportionately often. As a result, the traditional casebooks
spend much time on fine doctrinal refinements in these areas.
Conversely, issues that do not often make it into appellate courts play
minor roles in these books.
One example is the decision by police and prosecutors to charge
or decline to prosecute. Because charging discretion is all but
unreviewable, there is little case law to include in a traditional
casebook. The exercise of this discretion depends on internal police
and prosecutorial guidelines, as well as low-visibility, informal
customs and practices. Yet charging is immensely important. Many
cases end with a decision not to prosecute, and other charging
decisions determine the course of plea bargaining. Allen et al.
highlight these issues by excerpting the few cases on point and
supplementing these with statistics and thoughtful, targeted
commentary. Readers come to see the huge practical importance of
charging discretion and the dangers of abuse. As they note, one-fifth
of felony arrestees are never charged, one-fifth are never convicted
(usually because charges are dropped), and one-fifth are never
incarcerated (usually because of prosecutorial leniency).89 This
detailed and concrete discussion helps students to see both the
flexible potential for mercy and the risks of discrimination and
arbitrariness.
In discussing charging discretion, Miller & Wright go far beyond
the standard case law on selective prosecution and grand juries.
Their charging chapter considers police screening, prosecutorial
declination and diversion, laws that encourage or mandate charges,
selection of charges, and selection of system (state criminal court,
juvenile court, or federal court). Their excerpts include state and
federal cases, police department directives, Department of Justice
guidelines, congressional testimony, state and foreign statutes, and
prosecutorial guidelines.9" As a result, students understand low-
visibility police and prosecutorial decisions much better than they
could by reading Supreme Court doctrine alone. Both real-world
89 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 911-45; ALLEN ET AL. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note
26, at 221-26. The statistics are from page 911 of the casebook.
90 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 955-1052; see also id. at 340-54 (police
discretion in deciding to arrest).
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casebooks, in short, cultivate this field more carefully and yield richer
harvests.
Another neglected topic is plea bargaining. About 94% of
adjudicated felony defendants plead guilty, and most of these result
from plea bargains." Yet most doctrinal casebooks limit their
treatment to doctrine: when is plea bargaining permissible, what
kinds of pressures are impermissible, and what remedies are there for
breaches. Supreme Court doctrine is sparse on pleas and bargains,
because guilty pleas waive most appellate issues and so are under-
represented in appellate cases.92  The case-centered doctrinal
approach thus spends little space on the dominant case-disposition
procedure.
In contrast, Miller & Wright include academic literature on the
desirability of plea bargaining, state experiments with banning
bargaining, and prosecutorial guidelines on how to bargain.93 This
material can be difficult to teach, as it requires students to see the
incentives and interplay of prosecutors and other actors. If taught
well, it helps students to understand when and why prosecutors
bargain and when their superiors, victims, or voters might want to
rein them in. Allen et al. take a different but equally effective
approach. They give students a sample plea colloquy as well as
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, so students can see what
happens in a plea hearing. They also use secondary literature to
outline the history and practice of plea bargaining. Students get a
91 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, tbls.
5.21 (in 2001, of 68,633 federal defendants whose cases were not dismissed, 93.8% pleaded
guilty or nolo contendere, 2.2% had bench trials, and 4% had jury trials), 5.42 (in 1998, 94%
of state felony defendants whose cases were adjudicated were disposed of by guilty plea, 3%
by jury trial, and 3% by bench trial).
92 Guilty pleas forfeit most appellate or collateral claims based on events occurring
before the entry of the plea. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) (guilty plea
forfeits later double jeopardy claim when that claim turns on further evidence); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (race discrimination in selection of grand jury); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (coerced-confession claim). A few exceptional claims,
those that go to the very power of the government to charge the defendant, can be raised on
collateral attack. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (double jeopardy claim);
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (vindictive prosecutorial charging). And most
claims that do survive an ordinary guilty plea, such as where one's sentence falls within the
statutory range, can be waived as part of a plea agreement. See State v. Hinners, 471
N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1991); People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1989); see also United
States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201-02 (1995) (stating that the most defendants' rights
are waivable).
93 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 1269-1378.
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feel for how real lawyers approach the issues by reading interviews
with prosecutors and defense counsel. They see how caseloads,
procedural complexity, and prosecutorial power over charges and
sentences drive bargaining, and how prosecutors punish uncoopera-
tive defense counsel. Supplemental materials also show how victims
are left out of bargaining and consider whether that is desirable. 4 By
adding this context to the usual Supreme Court cases, Allen et al.
move beyond doctrine to a real-world institutional perspective.
The traditional casebooks are in step with the real-world
casebooks on one important topic: sentencing. Until the advent of
guidelines sentencing a few decades ago, there was almost no law of
sentencing, apart from capital-punishment cases. Now, with the
growth in sentencing guidelines and appellate opinions interpreting
them, most casebooks include substantial materials on sentencing.95
The traditional casebooks still lean toward constitutional issues of
little practical importance, such as the almost-nonexistent
proportionality review of non-capital sentences. On the whole,
though, the traditional casebooks have recognized and incorporated
this important new body of law.
Far too many law students imagine that their life after law school
will resemble Perry Mason's or Supreme Court practice. The real-
world casebooks balance the picture, by emphasizing the low-
visibility charging and plea bargaining decisions that are the heart of
criminal practice.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of two real-world casebooks marks the evolution
of the field. Professors now have choices beyond straight Supreme
Court doctrine. Those who want to plunge full-throttle into the
variety of state and federal cases, statutes, and rules have an excellent
option in Miller & Wright. Their exploration of community policing,
forfeitures, politics, race, plea bargaining, and sentencing is a
" ALLEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1031-1132.
95 COHEN & HALL, supra note 16, at 751-802; DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 16, at
1234-93; DRESSLER & THOMAS 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 86-107; KAMISAR ET
AL., supra note 16, at 1494-1533; SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 16, at 1310-88;
SALTZBURG & CAPRA 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 16, at 154-57. Compare ALLEN ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 1287-1352; ALLEN ET AL. 2001 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 15, at 101-04;
MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 1603-1722; MILLER & WRIGHT 2001 SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 14, at 263-84. Because White & Tomkovicz is limited to police investigations, it
does not include a chapter on sentencing.
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welcome break from a monolithic federal discussion of Miranda and
jury trials. True, this variety is harder to teach and less geared to the
bar exam, but the potential rewards of this challenging approach are
great. Allen et al. have written more of a hybrid book. They do
emphasize Supreme Court cases, but their sophisticated commentary
and exploration of real-world topics encourages discussion of areas
traditionally neglected. The book and its teacher's manual are
exceptionally thoughtful and thought-provoking. They strike a good
balance between laying out basic, accessible Supreme Court doctrine
and exploring how that doctrine plays out in the real world. Either
book is a welcome alternative to the abstract doctrine that dominates
the law school curriculum. These new choices supplement and
enrich the range of teaching approaches and materials.
What do these real-world shifts portend for criminal procedure?
The field is slowly becoming less a corner of constitutional law and
more a separate field with its own dignity. It is less the abstract
province of the Supreme Court and more a rich, varied landscape
with many actors and sources of law. It is about practice as well as
doctrine. Practice need not mean a dry, technical how-to manual.
This practical field is ripe for more empirical and game-theoretic
analyses of how actors respond to incentives. Practice and theory are
not inconsistent but should work together. For example, an
awareness of practical constraints should inform theory, and
induction from practice can lead to theory. The seeds of this
approach are sprouting in Allen et al. and Miller & Wright's
casebooks, but they are still saplings, not yet trees.
One area that requires more cultivation is how police, prosecu-
tors, defense counsel, and judges actually charge, screen cases, plea
bargain, and sentence. Albert Alschuler and Milton Heumann, for
example, studied plea bargaining by interviewing many prosecutors,
judges, and defense counsel.96 It has been thirty years since anyone
has done such comprehensive empirical studies of plea bargaining.
In the meantime, determinate sentencing has radically changed the
bargaining landscape, constraining judges and giving prosecutors
new leverage. This kind of empirical work, as well as game-theoretic
analyses of parties' incentives, can greatly illumine how the actors
use their powers.
96 HEUMANN, supra note 49, at 21 (describing research done in 1972-73); supra note 3
(collecting Alschuler articles) (describing research done in 1967-68).
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Another area that needs more work is the use of non-criminal
approaches to crime control. Though a few of the casebooks discuss
forfeitures, policing methods, curfews, and gang-loitering ordinances,
none really addresses nuisance laws or injunctions. Nor did any
consider possible civil injunctive or monetary relief from offenders,
gun dealers, or landlords of crack houses. One scholar, Neal Katyal,
has recently suggested other possibilities. He has explored the use of
architectural principles to fight crime by hardening crime targets,
building communities, and facilitating surveillance by bystanders and
residents.97 Another scholar, Darryl Brown, has discussed using
curfew laws and other quasi-regulatory measures to treat street crime
more like corporate crime.98 Criminal procedure could do more to
consider this proactive dimension to fighting crime, instead of being
almost entirely reactive. This expanded view of crime control would
see that the maintenance of order is perhaps more important than
detecting and punishing crimes after the fact.
Scholars should also explore more the pros and cons of state
procedural variations. Assessments of federalism in other contexts
generally pit the benefits of laboratories of experimentation versus
the dangers of a race to the bottom. The race-to-the-bottom idea,
however, seems inapplicable to crime. With a few exceptions, most
crime is local and does not forum-shop. The more cogent question is
how much local preferences, crime problems, and moral norms do
and should dictate varying criminal procedures. Outside of obscenity
law and capital punishment, there is very little scholarly discussion of
the role of local mores and attitudes in procedure. Scholars might use
the new emphasis on social norms to examine and critique these state
and local variations.
Finally, the corollary of detaching criminal procedure from
constitutional law is attaching it to its siblings, substantive criminal
law and sentencing law. I have argued elsewhere that criminal
procedure can go quite wrong when it ignores the impact of
sentencing law on plea bargains. It can go equally astray when it
pursues procedural values without considering substantive criminal
law.99 Putting criminal procedure in a real-world context requires us
97 Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002).
98 Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1295 (2001).
98 Bibas, supra note 7.
99 William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, supra note 4; Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and
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to explore how criminal procedure interacts with these other areas of
law.
Though scholars have much further to go, Allen et al. and Miller
& Wright have made impressive starts. The older pedagogical and
scholarly approaches to criminal procedure will benefit from the
addition of this new perspective. One can only hope that scholars
will continue to explore the real world that scholarship is to inform.
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
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